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A

NY ATTEMPT TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE is fraught with
difficulty and the likelihood that much of it will be wrong. If someone
in 1898 had tried to foresee issues relating to the implementation of the laws
and customs of war in the twentieth century, it is highly unlikely that he could
have foreseen many of the major developments that have characterized
warfare in this century and, therefore, the difficulties of implementation that
these created. At best, he could have based his attempt on trends, in particular
the development of mechanization at that time. Putting aside the possibility of
dramatic events like a catastrophic nuclear war, or unforeseeable fundamental
changes in the nature of warfare or the organization of international society,
the most one can hope to do is to extrapolate from present trends and see how
these could affect the implementation of the law in the future. In so doing, one
may assume that human nature will not change, although the organization of
society and of international relations could well do so.
Implementation of international humanitarian law can take place on three
levels, namely, by the individual undertaking an act during an armed conflict,
by the society for which he is acting, and finally by the efforts of the
international community. Generally speaking, laws that reflect the values of a
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society, or at least the interests of those in a position to enforce the law, have a
good chance of being implemented.
This article will attempt to analyze the factors that help or hinder the
implementation of the law. It will first examine those factors that helped such
law develop in customary practices, and analyze whether they continue to be
present this century and what the prospects might be for the future based on
present trends. The changes in international society that appear to be taking
place and the effect these may have on implementation will then be
considered. Finally, the article will consider certain mechanisms for
implementation. With respect to implementation, this author does not assume
that we should speak of implementation of the law in the next century as the
law stands now, but assumes that changes and developments will take place in
order to reflect developments in technology, methods of warfare, and society.
This article will therefore consider implementation of the major principles of
international humanitarian law that reflect its basic purpose as we understand
it today, namely, the limitation of means and methods of warfare and the
regulation of the treatment of persons in the power of adverse authorities in
order to limit the destructiveness and suffering of war.
Factors That Helped Ensure the Implementation of the
"Laws and Customs of War"
First, if rules reflect existing general practice, it is likely that their
implementation will not be particularly difficult, as efforts will probably be
limited to keeping in line the occasional individual who behaves differently
from others in his society.! It is noteworthy that prior to the attempts to codify
the law in the late nineteenth century, the laws and customs of war were an
articulation of the methods of warfare common to professional armies of that
time. Nonprofessional groups were not expected to conform to this law and
were, therefore, also not entitled to the privileges that were enjoyed by
professional armies, especially prisoner,of,war status. The protection of the
civilian population was assured largely by methods of combat rather than any
strict rule to that effect. The lack of such a strict rule is illustrated by the fact
that civilians did suffer greatly during sieges; they could even be forced back
into the besieged city if they tried to escape.2 On the other hand, the practice
in the Middle Ages whereby a city's population could be punished for
resisting capture was considered dishonorable and uncivilized by the eighth
century.3
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This brings us to the second factor of importance, namely, the belief by
combatants of the appropriateness of having certain rules in battle. Not only
did concepts of honor prevent the sacking of cities after capture, but they also
imposed a number of rules relating to the treatment of other combatants. Most
important were the prohibitions on the use of poison, treachery, and attacking
an enemy combatant once hors de combat. 4 These values and the sense of
responsibility that they entailed were clearly instilled not only by the societies
in which professional soldiers were brought up but also by the ethic of the
armies themselves. The criminality of violations of the law flowed fairly
naturally from this sense of appropriate and inappropriate behavior.
The extent to which reciprocity was important in the context of this ethic is
uncertain, for one must be careful not simply to project onto society of that age
the concept as perceived today. There is no conclusive evidence that
"civilized" societies, as they saw themselves, strictly required reciprocity for
every action vis,8.,vis each other.5 However, as far as behavior in relation to
"uncivilized" societies was concerned, it was conditioned by their incapacity, as
it seemed at the time, to apply or appreciate such niceties. Evidence of this is to
be found in the Lieber Code6 and in the arguments of the British when they
wanted to introduce the use of
(hollow,point) bullets.7 However,
another type of reciprocity did become important with the introduction of new
rules in treaties, namely, the international law rule that parties need to be
bound by the treaties in question. This was particularly evident in the general
participation clause of the Hague Conventions.8
A third factor which fosters implementation is ease in applying the law. As
the law followed practice in the last century, not being able to apply the law was
simply not a problem for professional armies. Any potential difficulty was met
by allowing exceptions where considered expedient. The most obvious
example of this was the rule that captured soldiers were not to be attacked;
exceptions were made ifkeeping them as prisoners of war was impossible for the
commander concerned.9
Fourthly, a lack of hatred for the enemy or of desire for personal vengeance
clearly helps prevent atrocities of all kinds. The fact that recourse to war was
not illegal, or even unusual, in the past helped armies view each other as fellow
profeSSionals doing their job. The notorious cruelty of non,international armed
conflicts is at least partly caused by the emotions involved, the other important
aspect being the frequent involvement of nonprofessional combatants.
Finally, mental healthiness among combatants helps prevent atrocities.
Although many may argue that only a deranged person would want to go into
battle, there can be no doubt that the short battles of the past and the sense of
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group cohesion in professional armies helped foster respect for the rules. On
the other hand, prolonged and excessive stress has a very adverse effect on a
soldier's capacity to abide by rules that require abstention from attack when he
feels threatened.
Factors That Help Or Hinder the Implementation of the Law:
Twentieth Century Difficulties and Future Prospects
Law and Methods of Warfare. The single most important factor in creating
problems regarding the implementation of the law in the twentieth century was
clearly the dramatic changes in the technology of warfare. This may well
continue to be a problem in the twenty,first century. Whereas war,making
methods in the nineteenth century were not dramatically different from those
of previous centuries, thus allowing the gradual development of customs which
reflected such practice, the sudden and major changes of the twentieth century
plunged the world into disarray and resulted in the need for extensive changes
in the law by treaty.
From Law Reflecting Practice to Law Preventing Practice. The major
motivation of the call by the czar of Russia for the conferences at the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth was the development of
weaponry that he perceived was taking place. This was farSighted, for the
extreme destructiveness of new technology was such that responsible
politicians simply could not continue to let law reflect practice, which would
have allowed whatever technology was capable of. However, this has meant
that the law has increasingly been dictated by the need to curtail practice
rather than reflect it, thereby creating tensions in relation to the
implementation of the law in the twentieth century. Changes in the law largely
prohibited certain new practices, such as the use of chemical weapons and
massive bombardments of cities, although those who indulged in such practices
were of the opinion that they had military utility. Other practices continued to
be allowed despite some attempts to outlaw them; they have been responsible
for a great deal of destruction and suffering. Examples include the use of
submarines, bombardment by aircraft, mines, and long,range missiles. These
inconsistencies have meant that the ethics of the law of war have become quite
unclear to both normal soldiers and laymen.
The law no longer takes the simple approach that all militarily useless
cruelty is prohibited, with the rest in principle allowed; the sheer destructive
nature of today's technical possibilities means that compromises have had to be
made for the sake of the survival of humanity. However, these compromises do
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not always appear very consistent to the average person. The fact that certain
bullets are prohibited but nuclear weapons have not been clearly and
unambiguously prohibited creates scepticism regarding the seriousness of any
of the law of war. The principle of proportionality in attack is an excellent
example of compromise between military and humanitarian needs, but the
implementation of this rule is somewhat subjective and unclear, and causes a
certain degree of doubtfulness among those who hear it for the first time. The
problem has been exacerbated by collateral damage that tends to occur after
the event, such as water shortages or other highly negative effects of attacks on
the power stations on which modern civilian society depends for surviva1. 10
The difficulty that civilians have in practice in obtaining protection from the
effects of hostilities has had the effect of creating questions as to the continued
need for law to protect combatants from excessively cruel weapons. ll
Potential New Weapons and the Need that Practice Again Reflect Law. The
perceived incongruity between practice and law that has developed this
century has created a serious image problem for international humanitarian
law. Law has to reflect practice at least to some degree in order to be taken
seriously. For the reasons indicated above, it was not possible simply to have
the law allow the use of any new technological possibility. Therefore, what is
needed is a means to make practice reflect the law, or at least the basic
principles of the law; in so doing practice can again reflect certain values rather
than having primarily to stop practice. This is particularly important as there is
evidence that we are, at the end of the twentieth century, on the brink of a
major change in war,making capability that could be at least as important as
the major changes that took place earlier in the twentieth century relative to
the nineteenth. The extent of research that is taking place to develop
directed,energy weapons means that we could see a major change in methods
of warfare. At present, it is difficult to imagine the full impact of this change,u
The ability of high,power microwaves and electromagnetic,pulse weapons to
incapacitate electronics has enormous potential for the destruction of the
life,support systems of technologically developed societies, which use such
electronics for all kinds of purposes. The potential effect of acoustic beams and
electromagnetic waves on persons is as yet not fully certain, nor is the extent to
which they could be weaponized for antipersonnel purposes. Antimateriellaser
beams are still being worked on, and one should not rule out the possibility of
the development of antipersonnel lasers that target persons in different ways
from the blinding laser weapons that have been recently banned.13 Although
the virtually instantaneous effect of these weapons, as well as their invisibility
and silence, is bound to change methods of warfare in a major way, it would
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require a military analyst with some imagination and foresight to indicate
precisely how.
Other
developments could be
weapons and various
"star wars" antimissile systems ran into
types of nuclear weapons. The
technical, as well as legal, difficulties, but it is not beyond possibility that these
could be developed during the next century to hit targets within the
atmosphere; currently, it is prohibited only to deploy nuclear weapons in space.
With regard to possible further developments in nuclear weapons, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should in theory prevent further
development, but there are indications that this is not the case in practice.
Abstension in use is largely due to their radiation effects; therefore, any
developments that could substantially reduce or even eliminate these effects
could tempt some to make use of their enormous blast capabilities. 14
Mention must be made of a potential new method of warfare that is already
prohibited in law but that could have horrific effects if developed, namely,
genetic weapons. The specter of this as well as of new and obviously
has already motivated States to
preliminary developments in
begin negotiations for the development of verification methods for the
Biological Weapons Convention. IS
Compared with these potential developments, present work on
weapons seems minor in comparison. However, care must
nevertheless be taken to evaluate their potential impact, because any that
could cause permanent disability would certainly not be more desirable from a
humanitarian point of view than normal conventional weapons, and it is not
even clear that all are necessarily
Potential effects on the
environment should also be considered. 16
This author does not suggest that there should be a stop to weapons
development. Not only would such a proposal be totally unrealistic, but some
new characteristics, such as increased accuracy or ways to render targets hors de
combat while minimizing damaging effects, could be positive developments.
However, it does mean that if we are to preserve certain values for the sake of
the survival of some notions of humanity, then those in a position to direct
weapons research and development requirements need to take their
responsibilities seriously. Therefore, it is important that in designing new
weapons the values of the laws of war be taken into account at the outset to
ensure not only that weapons are capable of distinguishing between civilians
and combatants but also that antipersonnel weapons cause neither inevitable
death nor permanent incapacity. Another factor of importance is the
increasingly fragile environmental state of our planet. This is not something

44

Louise
that weapons developers had to think much about in the past, but for the sake
of the survival of all of us it is earnestly hoped that this factor will be taken
seriously in any new design of weapons. Given that much new weapons
research these days is undertaken by companies which seek primarily to sell
their products, it if, important that States undertake to inform them beforehand
of effects which are contrary to the rules or principles of international
humanitarian law.

Belief in the Appropriateness of the Rules. Belief in the appropriateness of
humanitarian rules is the single most important factor for effective
implementation of the law. As already indicated, it has been dealt a severe blow
in the twentieth century by the inappropriateness of law primarily preventing
practice rather than reflecting it. It is clear that law will need to be developed in
order to address new methods of warfare. Some of such developments in the
past have usefully helped reflect professional military utility; for example, the
creation towards the beginning of this century of the notion of the military
objective, arising from a new ability to bombard targets from a distance, helped
reflect the military concept of economy of force.
The crisis of the twentieth century. The extensive effects of modem warfare
and the practice of conscription in the twentieth century has meant that war
making is no longer within the province of a few professionals. The fact that
war is no longer a lawful means of settling disputes may have also contributed
to a reduction in the professional respect between soldiers on opposing sides.
More seriously, basic notions of "honor" effectively died this century,
frequently leaving in their stead a certain cynicism toward, disbelief of, or plain
ignorance about the fact that warfare is meant to have rules. The international
community has tried to counter the increased destruction and cruelty of
warfare in the twentieth century by more extensive and detailed treaty law.
However, the fact that this law is for the most part not known, or where it is
known, not sincerely believed in, has led to serious difficulty in getting most of
it applied.
Some aspects of the law require interpretation by States, for example, the
basic principles prohibiting weapons that are by nature indiscriminate or cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. A lack of genuine belief in the
importance of these rules renders ig'noring them easy, and, generally speaking,
States have not been willing to declare specific weapons illegal on the basis of
these rules. l7 Instead, treaty prohibitions or a demise of use in practice have
tended to result from the enormous pressure of public opinion. IS Other rules
are straightforward and detailed, in particular those in the 1949 Geneva
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Conventions, which require certain respectful treatment of persons in the
power of an adverse party. It would be possible to apply most of these rules
without much difficulty if combatants and States genuinely believed in the
importance of them. However, a number of factors have prevented this,
including ignorance, hatred of the enemy, indifference, and competing
interests. It is clear that if soldiers are to abide by the rules, they must be
convinced that their commanders take such rules seriously and that to ignore
prescribed behavior will result in military discipline. 19 There is evidence that
this is beginning to improve, with more armies beginning to teach the laws of
war seriously. However, the situation is very far from perfect, and the personal
impression of this author, on the basis of speaking with military personnel from
around the world, is that their instruction in the law has been patchy or
nonexistent. 2o Respect for the law in future wars will depend to a great degree
on whether instruction on the pertinent rules is improved during military
training and whether the necessary sanctions are imposed, preferably by the
soldier's own country, in case of violations.
The Need to Repress Violations of the Law. The fact that international
humanitarian law has not been considered to be of major importance by States
is reflected in their failure to require the prosecution of war criminalsj more
than fifty years after the Geneva Conventions entered into force most
countries have still not carried out their obligation to provide for compulsory
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches. However, there can be no doubt
that the prosecution of such criminals would go a long way toward convincing
combatants of the serious nature of the law, rather than perpetuating its
present image of theoretical lip,service, or at most of double standards by
which some are prosecuted and others not. 21
There is at present quite a good chance that an international criminal court
will come into being in the next century, but whether this helps the image of
international humanitarian law or hinders it will depend almost entirely on the
jurisdiction of the Court. The present draft contains two provisions that could
seriously harm how it is perceived: that the United Nations Security Council
can prevent the Court from hearing such a case if it is itself dealing with the
conflict in questionj 22 and that the consent is required of the custodial State,
the State where the act occurred, and the States of which the victim and the
accused are nationals-consent that is in addition to their ratification of the
treaty!23 These draft provisions undermine both the notion of universal
jurisdiction for war crimes and the rule oflaw, and they are likely to encourage
further an image of double standards. In particular, the provision that requires
the consent of the State of which the accused is a national would notionally
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provide a form of State immunity to war criminals. As the whole purpose of an
international criminal court is to assure the prosecution of war criminals if they
are not tried by their own courts or extradited for trial, it is essential that the
court have inherent jurisdiction for such crimes. Otherwise, in the next
century implementation of the duty to repress war crimes will prove no better
than before.
The Influence of Society in General. Both an effective international criminal
court and respect for the rules by combatants during conflicts depend on a
genuine and clear understanding of the importance oflimits in warfare and of
respect for persons under control of an adversary. Detailed rules will inevitably
vary over time to accommodate changes in society and in methods of warfare,
but it is important to preserve the basic values. If these were viewed as
important by society in general, soldiers would perceive them as normal when
taught them during military training. The most insidious problem is that many
persons are of the opinion that war should know no rules and" that the only way
to deal with adversaries is to be stronger, more prepared than they are, and
willing to use any means to accomplish one's aims. This is based on a belief that
such means are necessary for personal and national survival. Unfortunately,
this is what the new generation seems to be primarily taught, through the
media and war,play computer games. The same means could instill
humanitarian law values, but unfortunately it is obvious that humanitarian law
is either unknown or not believed in--or considered completely irrelevant-by
those who produce these games and programs. This is a vicious circle that must
be rectified somehow. Otherwise, we could face a situation in the next century
where, with weapon developments which could be even more dangerous than
those of this century, the rulers and combatants will be uninterested in
upholding the values of international humanitarian law.

The Influence of International Human Rights Law and Human Rights
Organizations. In the second half of the twentieth century the driving factor in
keeping notions of limits on behavior in wartime alive has been the
development of human rights law. Despite the totally unrelated origin of this
law-it was primarily motivated by a desire to render governments accountable
for behavior towards their own citizens-the humanitarian, protective purpose
of human rights law has had its influence on the views of certain parts of the
international community.24 The horrors of the Second World War not only led
individuals to pressure States to include the promotion of human rights as a
basic purpose of the United Nations25 but also led to the creation of "crimes
against humanity" as an international offense and to conclusion of the 1948
Genocide Convention. Nor is it a coincidence that non,international armed
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conflicts were regulated by treaty for the first time in 1949. 26 A major step was
taken at the 1968 United Nations Human Rights Conference in Teheran,
where a resolution entitled "Human Rights in Armed Conflict" encouraged
States to afford more respect to existing humanitarian conventions and to add
further rules to protect "civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed
conflicts."27 The influence of human rights law can be clearly seen in the
wording of the fair trial guarantees in the 1977 Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions.28 (Ironically, humanitarian law could have usefully
influenced human rights law at that time, for the judicial guarantees found in
the Geneva Conventions were not listed as nonderogable rights in the
European Convention of Human Rights nor in the United Nations Covenants.
Practice since then has shown that this was a mistake.)29
In some respects, the influence of human rights law was inevitable, for much
in the Geneva Conventions that is devoted to protecting individuals overlaps
with a number of civil rights as well as with economic and social ones.
However, a major difference is that humanitarian law concerns itself with
behavior by all parties to a conflict, a concept particularly important in
non,international armed conflicts and for which human rights law is not
entirely suited. We will return to the particular problem of such conflicts.
Since the 1970s the United Nations has concerned itself with issues that
include important aspects of international humanitarian law in human rights
contexts, in particular in the Human Rights Commission and its
Subcommission for the Elimination of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities.3o Human rights rapporteurs have also been asked to analyze
subjects that primarily concern armed conflict. Some rapporteurs are theme
based, such as the special ones for mercenaries3! and for sexual violence during
armed conflict,32 while others are country based, such as those for
Afghanistan,33 the former Yugoslavia,34 Iraqi,occupied Kuwait,35 and
Rwanda.36
The most dramatic recent example of this trend is the present negotiation of
a Protocol Additional to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which will
be solely devoted to the recruitment and participation of children in
hostilities.37 There can be no doubt that most of the impetus for these
developments comes from nongovernmental human rights organizations,
which represent important segments of civil society.38 Resistance or protest
from civil society has also had a major effect on limits on weaponry. The nonuse
of nuclear weapons since the Second World War is largely due to such civil
protest, as was the desire following the Vietnam war to prohibit the use of
incendiary weapons.39 The call for the ban on blinding laser weapons, although
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originated by the governments of Sweden and Switzerland40 and primarily
pursued by the International Committee of the Red Cross, was boosted by the
support it received from various human rights organizationsY The most
stunning recent development in this regard is the ban on antipersonnel mines,
agreed to in principle by all States42 and actively supported by over one hundred
of themY In just five years the initial call in 1992 by six nongovernmental
organizations led to a coalition of about a thousand such entities, collectively
referred to as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.44 In 1997 it
received the Nobel Peace Prize for its work. The efforts were not entirely civilian,
for the original founder of this coalition was the Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation,45 and there can be no doubt that the decision by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in February 1993 to support such a ban helped the
process enormously.46 Certain military personnel were also supportive of the
process, by indicating that the harmful effects of antipersonnel mines outweigh
any military utility they may have-a classic humanitarian law appro achY
However, despite some military support, there can be no doubt that the trend at
present is for civil society to push most actively for restraints in methods and
means of warfare and in the protection of its victims.
What does this bode for the future? On the one hand, if this trend
continues, it means that humanitarian law principles are still being fought for
by some members of society. This should have the effect of saving at least some
of the law. If this concern filters down to the average person to the extent that
potential combatants consider restraint in armed conflict natural, a positive
development will have taken place. If, on the other hand, we continue to have
a clash of interests, with civil society continuing to make Herculean efforts to
regulate one aspect of the law at a time, its efforts could be overtaken by
contrary military or technological developments, and the tension between
legal principle and practice will continue into the next century.
Ease in Application of the Law. This issue is highly pertinent for the
implementation of the law relating to methods of warfare. As already indicated,
in the days when law followed practice and warfare largely consisted of
fighting and sieges, there was no particular difficulty in applying
the law. However, with the introduction of aerial bombardment and missile
warfare, the rules limiting attacks to military objectives and requiring
proportionality are not always easy to respect. First, accurate intelligence is
necessary in order to ascertain correctly which objects and persons are military
objectives and what their exact location is. Secondly, correct identification of
protected persons, vehicles, and buildings will continue to be problematic until
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more sincere efforts are made to take advantage of the technological
possibilities for identification. Thirdly, perfectly accurate weapons systems are
still in the minority. Finally, any assessment of proportionality in attack has so
substantial a subjective element that it is very difficult to gauge whether the law
has been respected.
Faced with these difficulties, both commanders and soldiers are likely to
make mistakes, and it is not surprising that the number of civilian casualties has
dramatically risen since the beginning of this century.48 A study by two
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) doctors has shown
statistically what has always seemed common sense before, namely, the more
use that is made of bombs and missiles as opposed to bullets, the greater the
number of civilian casualties compared with military ones. 49 It is the extreme
difficulty of in practice respecting Protocol II to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons applicable to landmines, particularly the rules relating
to limitation to military objectives and to marking and recording, that has led
the international community to ban antipersonnel mines altogether as
indiscriminate weapons.50
The phenomenon of fighting from a distance is said to adversely affect also a
combatant's care as to the nature of the target, for he will not see the damage
that is actually being done.51 Present trends, with increasing computerization,
are likely to exacerbate this problem. Unless major efforts are made to improve
the accuracy of identification and the accuracy of weapons generally available,
implementation of the law may well become more difficult.
Another aspect of concern is the complexity of the legal regime itself; the
more complex the rules, the more likely it is that they will not be followed
accurately. This has been seen in the context of the law of naval warfare, where
not only has there been no general treaty regulation since 1907, but the rather
complex traditional customary rules were also extensively violated during the
Second World War.52 Even the Nuremberg Tribunal, in the cases of Admirals
Doenitz and Raeder, confused the two separate notions of rescue after sinking
of a vessel and removal of personnel before sinking in situations where capture
is not possible.53 It is for this reason that during the drafting in 1994 of the San
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea54
this author argued for a simple rule prohibiting the attack and capture of
passenger vessels carrying only civilians-rather than allowing capture and
even destruction subject to certain rules, as now provided.55
The desire for simplicity can also be seen in the disappointment of many
States with the complex rules for the use of antipersonnel mines in Protocol II
Additional, as amended on 3 May 1996, to the Convention on Certain
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Conventional Weapons. Convinced that this would not really work in
practice, they went on to adopt the straightforward ban on antipersonnel mines
in Oslo in September 1997. The ban was embodied in the Ottawa Treaty in
December.

Attitude toward the Enemy. The prohibition of aggression, the rise in
ideological wars, and the increasing intensity of
armed
conflicts have all had the effect of introducing additional personal hatred for
the enemy in the twentieth century.56 For these reasons, the murder of civilians
is particularly acute in
armed conflicts, an issue that will be
revisited later. Unfortunately, in that there appears to be no downturn in this
trend, the problem could well become much worse in the next century, making
implementation more difficult, if not impossible in some situations. The
present rise in fundamentalism and fanaticism is extremely perturbing in this
regard. It is clear that in order to avoid the worst, the international community
will need to make a particular effort to try to solve certain situations of tension
caused by ethnic rivalries or other ideologies. It will also need to be more
assiduous in punishing violations of the laws of war, including those in
armed conflicts. More serious efforts should also be made to
limit the extent of proliferation of weapons, including small arms, to try to
minimize the effects of such wars.

Mental Health of Combatants. The longer the period of tension, the more likely
it is that combatants will suffer from combat stress disorder and have greater
difficulty in maintaining the discipline necessary to respect the rules in
threatening situations.57 Suggestions on improving this situation58 include
ensuring that weapon effect does not induce a sense of total helplessness in the
soldier,s9 and giving soldiers leave on a regular basis.60 The difficulty in accurately
identifying hostile objects from a distance is exacerbated by stressful situations, a
fact very clearly seen in the case of the USS Vincennes and its attack on the Iran
Air airbus in July 1988. Both the International Civil Aviation Organization
report and that undertaken by the United States attribute the mistake to the
feeling of tension on board the Vincennes at the time and the conviction by the
crew that they could well be attacked that day. This led a technician to so
misread the information on the computer screen that he believed the opposite of
what he saw.61 This mistake occurred in circumstances that did not amount to a
conflict, so one can only assume that in intensive armed conflict such
mistakes will be more frequent. Close range and rapid approach of a hostile
object makes the tension particularly acute.
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Unfortunately, the situation is likely to get worse in the future if major
developments in directed-energy weapons go ahead. This is primarily because
the effects of such weapons are virtually instantaneous and may well occur over
large distances, thus increasing the feeling of inability to defend oneself.
Inappropriate preemptive attacks may well result, leading to further attacks on
protected or civilian persons or objects.
Changes in the Structure of International Society
Inter-state Armed Conflicts Are in the Minority. This situation is not in itself
unfortunate, for it shows that the rules prohibiting the use of force by one State
against another have had some effect. This author is also not convinced that
internal armed conflicts have actually become more numerous as such; rather,
we are more aware of what is going on in all parts of the world, and the level of
weaponry now available in such conflicts means that they have a more serious
effect on the population. The extent of political and commercial intercourse
between States also means that the effects of such conflicts are far more serious
in international relations than they used to be. However, the facts remain that
inter-State conflicts are in the tiny minority and that unless this situation is
seriously addressed, most of international humanitarian law is at risk of being
perceived as largely irrelevant to modern realities.
It is an obvious truism that international law is primarily aimed at regulating
relations between States, human rights law notwithstanding. Despite Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, the detailed
rules of international humanitarian law have been largely developed for
international armed conflicts. The easiest legal application is in the case of a
classic conflict between States. It is also a truism to state that far more
numerous than international armed conflicts are non-international armed
conflicts and actions by various international peacekeeping or peaceenforcement groups.
Present trends seem to show that this situation is likely to continue into the
next century. We are witnessing not only the breakup of a number of nations
and increased stress on local government within nations, but also an increasing
trend towards supranational law in the form of economic and political
international organizations with extensive lawmaking powers and increasing
influence in international affairs. At the same time, force is being used quite
extensively by private groups of a financial or criminal nature, with effects that
cannot be ignored. The challenge of the next century will be how to deal
effectively with these developments. It will require a willingness to venture into
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legal regulation that does not rely on classical methods of qualifying a conflict,
which at present can determine only whether a conflict is international or
non,international.

Non,InternationalArmed Conflicts. In practice, soldiers are not trained in two
different ways, and this is reflected by the fact that most existing military
manuals do not include one set of rules for international armed conflicts and
another for non,international ones. The problem is mostly one of principle. It is
unfortunate that a number of States are still unwilling to admit the formal
applicability of more detailed rules for non,international armed conflictj their
view is that this would amount to some kind of interference in their internal
affairs or could be seen as granting international recognition to opposing forces.
The negotiation of Additional Protocol II illustrated the widely differing views
of States on this important issue.62
The Principle of Application of International Humanitarian Law. There being
no indication that non,international armed conflicts are dropping in number,
we are likely to see a continuation of this problem in the next century. In
principle, professionally trained soldiers should be able to use the same
methods for international and non' international armed conflicts.
Application by GovemmentalArmed Forces. As far as behavior by government
armed forces and other governmental institutions is concerned, they are in law
bound by the wording of Common Article 3, Protocol II, where applicable, and
relevant human rights law. As indicated above, willingness to regulate internal
armed conflicts by treaty arose when international human rights law came into
being. However, States that are not keen on human rights law tend also to
resist further regulation of internal armed conflicts in international
humanitarian law. The difficulties during the negotiation of Protocol II were
such that the compromise which resulted in the definitive text came at the last
minute, allowing very little discussion on the final wording. This has resulted in
an incongruous situation, in that some of the rules in Protocol II63 are more
absolute in their protections than those to be found in Protocol Ij it is obvious
that reference to the equivalent articles in Protocol I will be necessary for their
interpretation in practice. It is also hoped that the study presently being
undertaken by the ICRC on rules of international customary law will further
elucidate the rules generally accepted as being applicable in non,international
armed conflicts.64 It is quite likely that the study will indicate points of
weakness where the international community could be encouraged to continue
work towards greater specificity.
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There is one area, however, where application of the rules by governmental
armed forces is difficult-the distinction between the civilian population and
others. Common Article 3 does not define what is meant by the "armed forces"
of the other party, nor is there any definition of who are considered to be
combatants. Civilians are referred to simply as persons who do not take an
"active" part in the hostilities. Does this mean that all other persons are
combatants that can be attacked? What does "active" mean? Is it the same as
the term "direct" found in Article 13 of Protocol II? Article 1 of Protocol II is
better in this regard, as it describes the type of dissident armed forces that need
to exist for Protocol II to come into effect. One could assume that only persons
belonging to such groups are combatants and that all other persons are
civilians. However, Article 13, paragraph 3, speaks of the protection of
civilians unless they take "a direct part in hostilities." This could be interpreted
as meaning that all persons that do not take such a direct part are civilians.
However, this interpretation could conflict with the concept of "armed forces"
referred to in Article 1, and it may well be that the reference to "direct"
participation is only the equivalent of Article 51, paragraph 3, of Protocol 1.
These issues are not academic but rather very practical ones that regularly
arise when attempting to assess whether certain attacks are lawful or not. It is
very common in internal armed conflicts to have persons who mostly lead
normal lives yet indulge in guerrilla activities from time to time. Can they be
attacked at any time and in any place? We also find the phenomenon of
civilians armed and trained to fight, ostensibly for their own protection, but
also for the purposes of those who trained them. What is their status? What is
the status of children who are asked to deliver messages to guerrilla groups,
especially messages that are important for intelligence purposes? A major effort
should be made to find answers to these basic questions so that the lawfulness
armed conflicts can be more readily assessed in the
of acts in
future.
Application by
Forces. As to the behavior of
groups, there are both theoretical and practical problems.
The application of international law to
groups is still
perceived by many governments as problematic despite the existence of
Common Article 3 and the ratification of the Geneva Conventions by virtually
all States. Recent attempts by the government of Colombia to indicate clearly
that the new treaty banning antipersonnel mines applies to
entities
ran into difficulties when certain Western governments could not accept the
proposition that such entities might have responsibilities under international
law.65 In the end, Colombia had to content itself with the preambular
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paragraph indicating that the rules of humanitarian law apply to all parties to a
conflict, and a statement at the closing session as to the importance of this
point-a statement supported by the ICRC at the same session.66
Another example of the same problem arose in the context of the
negotiations for the Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.67 A
number of States and the ICRC spoke in favor of a rule that would prohibit all
armed conflict from recruiting children under
parties to a
the age of eighteen years.68 Several States could not accept this, and the draft
now indicates two possible methods of dealing with this issue, neither of which
is satisfactory. Draft paragraph 2 merely states that the government is to ensure
that children under eighteen are not recruited;69 draft "New Article A,"
presently in square brackets, would require governments to "take all
appropriate measures to prevent recruitment of persons under the age of 18
years by
armed groups involved in hostilities."7o These
proposals may be doctrinally pure in the minds of strict international lawyers,
but they are hardly useful when it comes to the actual behavior of
groups.
The application of human rights law concepts to
forces is
far more problematic than that of humanitarian law concepts. This is because
human rights law is primarily conceived as consisting of the obligations of the
government towards its own population, not the other way around.71 This
principle was another reason why a reference to the duties of
groups was not accepted for the draft Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the ChildY Humanitarian law, on the other
hand, is meant to apply to both parties to a conflict; indeed, the very notion of
equality of obligations is fundamental to the nature of this law. However, a
major problem is that although States wished these obligations to be made clear
in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, they did not wish the
corollary to be true, i.e., the same rights for rebel forces.
One of the most important motivating factors for the respect of
humanitarian law is the right to the status of prisoner of war, and the certainty
of not being punished if one has not violated the rules of international
humanitarian law. Given that this is not the case in internal armed conflicts,
what is the motivating factor for
entities to abide by international
law? They can hope to gain some respect, perhaps, and there is also the
recommendation in Article 6, paragraph 5, of Protocol II that the broadest
possible amnesty should be granted at the end of hostilities. It is assumed,
although not specifically indicated, that such amnesty should not apply to
those who have violated humanitarian law, at least in any serious way.
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However, this does not seem to be very persuasive, and another method will
need to be found to create a motivation to abide by the rules of international
law. In this regard, one could consider both the carrot and the stick. The carrot
could be, for example, allowing respect of international law rules to be used in
mitigation of sentence when such persons are tried in national courts. The
stick could be more rigor in trying violators of the law before international
tribunals, such as that created for Rwanda, the statute of which specifically lists
crimes that are violations of international humanitarian law applicable in
non-international armed conflictsY For this reason, this author hopes that the
new Statute of the International Criminal Court will include such crimes.
Given that many persons using force in non-international armed conflicts
have not been members of an official State army, it is not surprising that they
are quite unaware of even the existence of rules applicable to such situations,
let alone their content. The ICRC tries to teach some of these rules to such
forces and has had some success, but its approach has certainly not always
worked. 74 The only way to make such forces have some idea of these rules is to
ensure that the civilian population as a whole is aware of them. This is certainly
not the case at present, and most governments have made no particular effort
to remedy this situation. In light of the increasingly destructive and
destabilizing nature of non-international armed conflicts, a determined and
serious effort in this regard must be made in the next century. However, it
should be realized that knowledge of such rules cannot assure that they will be
perfectly respected, even if supported by nongovernmental groups. As
indicated above, some of the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities require
quite sophisticated training and means. Therefore, the goal must be to reduce
the incidence of direct attacks on civilians, torture, and other acts from which
the forces involved could abstain if so inclined.
The Problem of Weapons Availability. The final element of particular
importance in relation to such conflicts is the ready availability of weapons.
The end of the Cold War and relaxation in regulations relating to arms
transfers led to significantly increased availability of weapons. The ICRC has
been asked by the twenty-sixth International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent to submit a report indicating whether there is a direct link
between this availability and violations of the law. 7s This author suspects, using
an analogy, that this effort will experience the same difficulty of proof as did the
connection between smoking and cancer but that common sense dictates that
it must be so. The more persons who without instruction or special training use
force and have firearms, the more violations there are likely to be. This
situation will get worse in the next century unless the international community

56

Louise Doswald,Beck
finds the political will to stem such arms flows. This will require not only the
creation of clear guidelines for transfers but also a means to verify their
implementation.

The Use of Armed Force by Private Persons or Groups. The armed forces of
private entities can take the form of mercenaries (although not a new
phenomenon, one that has caused particular problems at the end of this
century), security companies (hired by private industry), or criminal groups
with extensive organization and war,making ability.
Mercenaries. The use of mercenaries is an ancient practice that shows no
indications of ceasing. In the past such persons simply had the same status, and
were entitled to the same treatment, as the group for which they were fighting,
which in turn depended on whether the conflict was international or
non,international. However, since 1977 a significant segment of the
international community has tried to eliminate this practice by, inter alia,
refusing such persons prisoner,of,war status. 76 So long as mercenaries continue
to exist, the problem of how to motivate them to abide by the rules of
international humanitarian law will remain. In this regard, the carrot,and,stick
approach suggested for nongovernmental groups in non,international armed
conflicts could prove useful.
Private Security Companies. A relatively new phenomenon is the practice of
private security companies offering their services to governments or private
industries, particularly in unstable areas where the government's normal police
force cannot provide adequate protection. The best known example is
"Executive Outcome," a security company which operates quite extensively in
Africa; a number of others are active in a variety of contexts.77 Although such
companies are frequently referred to as "mercenaries" in the media, they do not
fall within the traditional understanding of the term, nor do they easily fit
within the legal definition found in Article 47 of Additional Protocol Us
However, they do use military methods and consist primarily of ex,soldiers.
A major issue is whether security companies are bound by any international
rules. \Vhen used by governments in the context of an internal armed conflict,
it is arguable that they form part of the government's forces and thus are bound
by the rules of non,international armed conflict. However, they are not
officially part of the government's army. Moreover, the concept of mercenaries
in Article 47 of Protocol I applies only in international armed conflicts. Insofar
as multinational or other industries use such companies, they ought to be
accountable in some way for their behavior; yet they are neither a State nor a
party to an internal armed conflict in any traditional sense of the word. The
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security companies concerned are in principle bound by the law of the State in
which they function. In reality, this will not have much effect if they actually
engage in hostilities, which press reports say that they have done in some
instances. Given the increasing influence of private industry and the growing
importance of multinational companies, the international community is going
to have to face this issue and decide whether the use of force by such companies
against armed groups should be subject to international rules. If so, a departure
will have to be made from the traditional application of international
humanitarian law to governments and armed rebel groups.
Criminal Groups. Criminal groups engaging in armed conflict include the
Mafia and various "drug lords," whose activities are extensive not only
internally but internationally. On the one hand, it seems abhorrent to suggest
that they should be bound by international humanitarian law. On the other, it
is difficult in law to justify any distinction inasmuch as traditional rebel groups
in non,international armed conflicts are also considered common criminals by
the authority they are opposing. The term "armed groups" in common Article 3
is arguably general enough to cover criminal groups, but one generally assumes
that humanitarian law has in mind groups fighting for a political purpose. This
assumption derives from the historical context of the development of the law,
but it is written nowhere. An added complication is that some rebel groups,
including a number in Colombia, ostensibly have some political purpose (albeit
often obscure), though they use straightforward criminal methods and drug
money.79 The lack of clarity as to whether international law is applicable in
these situations makes its implementation very difficult. Even if one assumes,
as this author does, that a group should possess some political purpose if
humanitarian law is to be applicable, there remains the problem of determining
the facts. Doing so can be extremely difficult in unstable, internal conflict
situations. A tragic example of this was the murder of six employees of the
ICRC on 17 December 1996 in Novye,Atagy, Chechnya. Although an official
enquiry has opened, we are at at the time of writing still no nearer to
establishing who was responsible, or even whether the attack clearly amounted
to a violation of international humanitarian law, given that the various groups
active in that highly volatile situation included both the criminal Mafia and
armed political groups.so
Unfortunately, there is every indication that this type of unstable situation is
likely to continue or even worsen in the next century. At the moment,
international law does not really have an answer. 81 In particular, international
humanitarian law, which is supposed to regulate the use of force, does not in its
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present form provide concrete and practical answers as to how the law can be
applied to and implemented in such situations.
Use of Force by Multinational and Supranational Entities. The use of force by
the United Nations was foreseen in Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, which also assumed that the forces would be UN forces as such.
However, only fairly recently has the question of whether the United Nations is
bound by international humanitarian law been addressed in any serious way.
The issue is not limited to the UN. Multilateral forces, whether acting under
the umbrella of a regional security organization such as NATO or as ad hoc
coalitions, also face the challenge of establishing which law applies. This issue
is at present largely considered from the perspective of interoperability. The
increasing financial and political interdependence of States is also leading to a
situation where supranational actors could be increasingly active in armed
conflict issues, the most obvious example being the new "European Union's
Treaty of Amsterdam. This trend means that international humanitarian law
can no longer be limited to the behavior of individual nationsj otherwise, the
defense policies of such organizations and their use of force will not be formally
. •
bound by any hard humanitarian law.
United Nations Forces. The issue of which law binds United Nations forces is
not a purely academic one. There have been allegations of violations of the law,
particularly in the case of United Nations operations in Somalia, wherein UN
forces have been accused of murdering noncombatants and of detaining
Somalis without allowing contact with lawyers or their families. s2 Through
participation agreements, personnel contributed by States fall formally under
the command of the UN Secretary-General. Further, the United Nations is an
international person in international law. Therefore, although one could argue
that each contingent is still bound by the humanitarian law that binds its flag
State, this conclusion is not at all satisfactory from either a legal or a practical
point of view. The area of practice is actually rather confused, with the UN
force commander being in theory responsible but with heads of national
contingents retaining a certain control.S3 The actual name given to the force
should be irrelevant, as the question of applicability of humanitarian law
should arise when hostilities actually occur, whether the dontingent was meant
to be a peacekeeping force in the traditional sense or was given a more active
role.54
The difficulty at present is that apart from cases of clear enforcement action,
UN forces are not meant to be seen as belligerents in the traditional sense of
the term. Humanitarian law is meant to apply to "parties to a conflictj" the
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normal role of peacekeeping forces does not fit easily into this description. The
fact that the United Nations is not a party to humanitarian law treaties
compounds the problem. In past operations, agreements have indicated that
such forces are bound by the principles of humanitarian law but not by a
specific list of humanitarian law rules.s5 The current UN model agreement
provides that such forces "observe and respect the principles and spirit of the
general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military
personnel.,,86 The ICRC has tried through expert meetings to establish which
rules are applicable to such forces, both when they intervene in
non, international armed conflict situations and during international armed
conflicts.87 Given the difficulty of finding an answer (which this author believes
is insuperable because the law simply does not envision the situation), the
experts concerned drafted a document entitled "Guidelines for UN Forces
Regarding Respect for International Humanitarian Law."as The fate of this
work is not clear, as these guidelines have not been officially adopted.
However, personnel at the UN Secretariat are aware that it is an issue that
needs resolving.
It is highly likely that such forces will continue to be used in the next
century, and it is simply not acceptable to allow it to remain unclear which
international legal rules govern UN forces. The international community will
need to accept and address the fact that while UN forces use force, the
traditional scope of the application of humanitarian law treaties prevents the
proper implementation of suitable rules for such forces.
Multinational Forces. Multinational forces can be specifically authorized by
the United Nations, either for an enforcement action, as with the coalition
effort against Iraq in 1991, or to conduct a humanitarian mission, such as that
in Albania.89 In principle such forces apply humanitarian law by virtue of the
international law obligations undertaken by each State. However, with such
official authorization, the question arises as to whether such forces should
undertake as a group to apply specific rules of humanitarian law. Not all States
will be parties to the same treaties, and therefore problems of interoperability
arise. This is true for forces of a regional organization such as NATO,90 or ad
hoc forces, like the multinational forces in Beirut in 1982-198491 or Liberia in

1990.92
In that it is quite likely that multinational forces will continue to be used in
the next century, proper implementation of humanitarian law requires greater
clarity as to the rules under which they will operate and how those rules will be
carried out in practice.
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Supranational Organizations. Although there is no such thing as
"supranational" law-a matter of concern to some purist international
lawyers-the fact remains that there are arrangements whereby States have
given non,national organs powers that go well beyond the usual functions of
international organizations. The most obvious example of this is the European
Union. The Treaty of Amsterdam, adopted in 1997, contains provisions in
Title V on a "common foreign and security policy.,,93 Article }.3 states, "The
European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence
implications." More specifically, Article J. 7 provides that:
The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to
the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common
defence policy ... which might lead to a common defence, should the European
Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the
adoption of such a decision in accordance with their constitutional
requirements.
The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development
of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability.... It
supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and
security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster
closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the
integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so
decide ....
The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as
Member States consider appropriate, by co-operation between them in the field
of armaments.
Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue
tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacekeeping.
The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions
and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

Although the provision does not mean that the European Union will have
its own army as such, it comes close. More importantly, the Union is to have its
own policies relating to armed conflict situations, whether for its own defense
or in relation to other armed conflicts. The European Union as such is not a
party to humanitarian law treaties, but the question arises as to whether it is
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bound by them. Does customary law bind it? These are fundamental questions
for the implementation of humanitarian law.
The ICRC attempted to persuade European Union States to include
references to international humanitarian law in the sections of the treaty
dealing with foreign and security policy.94 Other parts of the treaty make
reference to the importance of respecting human rights law; therefore, such a
mention of humanitarian law in the relevant sections would have been totally
appropriate. These efforts were unsuccessful, an extremely unfortunate
outcome in this author's opinion.
In the light of such developments, States cannot continue to simply assume
that the present scope of application of humanitarian law treaties suffices.
What if the European Union uses the WEU in an internal armed conflict in a
way that involves fighting? Does all law apply, or only that law applicable to
internal armed conflicts? What of the duty of States in common Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions to respect them and ensure their respect? Does the
obligation also apply to policies of the European Union as such? Which body
will implement whatever is supposed to be the applicable law? The European
Court of] ustice even though there is no mention of humanitarian law in any of
the European Union treaties? Do the general references to human rights in the
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties suffice? Such issues will have to be faced in
the future, although it would be better to do so before becoming involved in a
difficult situation.
Implementation Mechanisms

It may seem strange in an article about implementation to refer to
implementation mechanisms only rather briefly, in closing. However, this
author believes that the preceding issues are more fundamental to the
problems of implementation procedures. Mechanisms will only be efficient if
the will exists to make them so, and that depends on the factors outlined
earlier. Therefore, this section will not explore existing and potential
implementation mechanisms in detail;95 rather, it will look at factors that are
relevant for such mechanisms in the future.

National Mechanisms. Obviously, if the implementation mechanisms already
foreseen for the national level had been carried out, we would be in a much
better situation than we are now. In the face of the enormous challenge of
rectifying the present situation, the ICRC's new Advisory Service96 has had to
set priorities.97 It has therefore decided to try to create a snowball effect by
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encouraging the creation of national commissions responsible for national
implementation of humanitarian law.98 It is also making particular efforts to
induce States to comply with their duty under the Geneva Conventions to
provide for universal jurisdiction for grave breaches.99 In this regard, there can
be no doubt that if States could arrange for the direct applicability of the treaty
provisions, a great deal would be gained. This could perhaps ultimately make
national courts able not only to try war criminals more effectively but also to
award reparation to victims of violations. At present, the latter possibility is
being explored by the Human Rights Commission,100 and there are cases being
brought by individuals before national courts asking for reparations for
violations committed during the Second World War. 101 Success by such
individuals would almost certainly motivate governmental and nongovern,
mental bodies to abide by their obligations with greater care.
Some imagination and determination will also be needed to make sure that
the civilian population as a whole is aware, at least at the most basic level, of
certain rules of armed conflict. In formal teaching, the topic could be introduced
into a number of traditional school courses, probably together with some notions
of human rights. However, other methods will also be necessary. In particular,
efforts should be made to stem teaching that encourages violations of the law.
For example, behaviors that should not be introduced in computer games could
be made known to game creators, and those that should be promoted could be. It
has already been suggested that industries developing new weapons should
become aware of certain international rules. They have at least one strong
motivation for making an effort to do so, namely, the thought of the money they
would waste should they develop a weapon that is then formally prohibited!

International Mechanisms. Reference has already been made to the
importance of an effective international criminal court, and to the conditions
that are necessary for one. Provision for commissions of inquiry already
exists,102 and some investigation has occurred on an ad hoc basis, such as the
investigation into violations of the law in the former Yugosiavia 103 and
Rwanda,lOf and the country rapporteurs established in the context of the
Human Rights Commission. 1OS Assessing violations of methods of warfare will
remain particularly difficult, because factors relating to the assessment of
military objectives and proportionality have an important subjective element.
However, such inquiry remains a useful mechanism, and it is hoped that it will
be used more in the future.
It remains to be seen whether other mechanisms could be introduced that
would be useful to encourage better implementation of humanitarian law in
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future wars. The suggestion has been made to introduce a reporting system in
which States could inform a body on the measures they have taken to
implement humanitarian law. l06 Such reporting systems are being used in other
contexts, with mixed results (determined by a number offactors).107 In the
context of humanitarian law, such a system would have greater likelihood of
acceptability and success once States have taken more effective national
measures, which it is hoped will be the fruit of the Advisory Service's efforts
and of the fuller understanding being gained these days of the importance of
this aspect oflaw.
One area that should certainly be improved is the evaluation, at the
research stage, of the likely lawfulness of weapons. 108 At present, evaluations
are made either at the national level or at the international level if a particular
weapon is called into question. In the latter case, assessments are hampered by
the lack of unclassified information. The case of blinding laser weapons was
somewhat special because there had been extensive use of lasers by
ophthalmologists for eye surgery and by the military for nonoffensive purposes;
this enabled experts to extrapolate the likely features and effects of the
forthcoming proposed weapons. l09 In most cases, however, a weapon has to
appear on the battlefield, and even be generally available, before an evaluation
can occur. Obviously, there will be resistance to legal evaluation at this stage
given the investment that will have gone into its development. Over the last
hundred years, no State leader has shown the kind of altruism that the czar of
Russia did when he convened an international conference to ban a weapon
developed by his own scientists! 110
This author is well aware of the highly sensitive nature of this issue, but
given the crisis in the implementation of humanitarian law created by the
totally new weapons of the twentieth century, and given the need for practice
to be in conformity with law rather than in constant tension with it, an
evaluation of the foreseeable effects of contemplated new weapons is the only
way to implement this area oflaw effectively. Such an evaluation cannot be left
to a totally national mechanism, but must include unbiased and neutral
persons. With present rapid technological and biotechnological developments,
this will be crucial for the
century. This process would be helped by
the establishment of more objective data and criteria for evaluating whether
certain weapons present problems in relation to the rules prohibiting
inherently indiscriminate weapons or those that cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering. 111 A mechanism will also need to be found that will
sufficiently protect the sensitive nature of the material. This author believes
that if the political will were present, it would not be impossible to find one.
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Such a mechanism could also study the likely effects of means or methods of
warfare on the environment. l12 The relative novelty of this problem makes it
difficult at present to foresee with accuracy the extent and permanence of
environmental damage that will occur. However, with the degree of present
environmental degradation, the world's ever-increasing population, and
forecasts of water shortages,113 all the elements of future disaster are present.
Not only are these factors likely to be the cause of a number of wars in the next
century, but the problem will be exacerbated if means or methods of warfare
significantly contribute to further environmental damage.
Although it is a sensitive issue, further thought needs to be given to the fact
that the possibility of nuclear war remains. Despite all efforts to stem
proliferation, it is not impossible that a State or group could decide to use these
weapons without fearing or caring about retaliation. All existing mechanisms
to prevent such an occurrence need to continue. In addition, now that the
Cold War has ended, more serious attention should be given to the Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice that there is an obligation to
achieve "nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control" through bona fide negotiation. 114
Reference has already been made to the need to find better means to
conflicts. Specific mechanisms
implement humanitarian law in
should also be considered, for implementation by international and
"supranational" bodies, of a system of reparations for victims of violations and
of punishment for offenders. The implementation of the law in
armed conflicts and in
"internationalized" ones
would benefit from an independent and impartial qualification of the conflict.
The ICRC frequently does not do this publicly because of possible implications
for its field work. The ideal situation, of course, would be for an independent
court to undertake this task, but it could also be given to an independent
commission. The experience of human rights law shows that mechanisms
allowing for individual petition are particularly successful in ensuring that
issues are addressed. liS Through this channel, cases relating to situations which
may qualify as armed conflicts have been brought under the European
Convention on Human Rights, but the European Commission of Human
Rights or European Court of Human Rights does not have to make such a
qualification, as it is unnecessary for the application of human rights law. 116
Finally, it is worth addressing the particular role of civil society, in particular
nongovernmental organizations. Until now the implementation of
humanitarian law has been largely left to governments. ll7 The only official
nongovernmental role was that given to the ICRC, in particular through its
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visits to prisoners of war118 and civilian internees 119 and its role relating to the
Central Tracing Agency120 in international armed conflicts. A recognition of
additional roles that it may undertake, with the consent of the parties to the
conflict, is found in various other parts of the Conventions, including roles
armed conflicts. References are also made to national
during
Red Cross or Red Crescent societies. The recognized role of the ICRC in
fostering the development of humanitarian law means that in practice it is
given observer status at diplomatic conferences relating to international
humanitarian law. 121 In this context it is frequently requested to prepare
documentation and allowed to make statements and proposals.
Until now, other organizations have not had any such formal role.
Therefore, it was a significant development when the Norwegian government
decided to allow the International Campaign to Ban Landmines the same
observer status as the ICRC during the diplomatic conference that led to the
adoption of the antipersonnel mine ban treaty in September 1997. The
contribution of this organization is specifically mentioned in the preamble to
the treaty, the relevant paragraph of which makes a point of "stressing the role
of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by
the call for a total ban of antipersonnel mines and recognizing the efforts to
that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous
other
organisations around the world."m Language from
the Martens Clause was intentionally included.123 This means that the
"Ottawa process," which culminated in signature by many States of the treaty
banning antipersonnel mines in Ottawa in December 1997, specifically
recognized the importance of civil society monitoring the implementation of
humanitarian law and being involved in its development where appropriate.
Those States which did not participate in this process cannot be said to
approve this practice, and therefore one cannot say that it is a universally
tendency. However, it does reflect the already existing practice of
human rights bodies giving a recognized role to nongovernmental
organizations. 124 The next century may well see, therefore, an important
development in this direction for humanitarian law.
Conclusion
The
century could easily witness a catastrophic lack of
humanitarian law implementation, with much of it being seen as irrelevant
ones.
because the vast majority of conflicts are not classic
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Dangerous new means and methods of warfare, ideological conflicts, and
further rampant arms proliferation, all taking place in the context of an
increasingly disturbing environmental situation, could easily spell disaster.
Political will could prevent such a scenario, but this requires a willingness to
depart from the usual way of thinking. Efforts should be made to establish how
the law can be applied to nontraditional situations, and effective mechanisms
put in place. Whether this will be done essentially depends on how important
the regulation of armed conflict is considered to be when balanced against
competing interests. It also depends on whether one is willing to be farsighted
and realize the long-term interest in preserving the values of humanitarian
law-an application of enlightened self,interest. The author is enough of a
realist not to expect this to happen by itself. However, certain tendencies do
give hope. Humanitarian law is more talked of these days than it was even a few
years ago, and some mechanisms are beginning to work, albeit for the time
being in a rather uneven fashion. The further involvement of civil society has
been important for this development, and there is no obvious reason why it
should weaken in the future. Therefore, it may well be that the implementation
of humanitarian law, whatever its exact content needs to be in the next
century, will improve compared with this one. One can try to be an optimist!
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did.
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second Gulf War.
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18. This point will be returned to below in the context of the influence of human rights law.
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general problems in the implementation of international humanitarian law were formally
accepted by the 26th Internarional Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, December
1995, Resolution 1.
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U.N. Doc. NAC.249/1997/WG.3/CRP.l/Rev.1, draft art. 23 para. 3.
23. Id., draft art. 21 his, para. 1.
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Chernichenko and Treat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34. The ICRC was not as careful prior
to the 19705 as it is now to ensure that human rights treaties give at least as much protection as
humanitarian law ones.
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the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (protocol II), June 8, 1977,
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(1995).
96. Created on the recommendation of the Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of
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Res. 935 (1994), U.N. Doc.S/1994/1125.
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106. DUring the Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of
War Victims referred to in note 64 supra. The proposal was made by the Netherlands and
supported by several States but did not command sufficient support to be included in the
meeting's recommendations.
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analyzed in a report entitled "A Comparison of Self-Evaluating State Reporting Systems"
prepared by E. Kornblum for the meeting. Reprinted in INTL REv. RED CRoss, Nos. 304 and 305,
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humanitarian law.
109. Meeting of the First Working Group of Experts, supra note 57, at 95-173.
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Declaration of 1868.
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Battlefield Laser Weapons, supra note 57, at 179-183,244-257, and 289-292.
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FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 17; Remans, Water and War, HUMANITARESVOLKERRECHT:
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114. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, para. 105 F.
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concerns actions by security forces against Kurdish groups resulting in deaths of civilians. The
Commission found a violation of Article 2 (the right to life), because the security forces did not
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117. Protecting Powers, formal complaints, investigations by the U.N., etc. The
International Fact-Finding Commission would not be a governmental mechanism as such, for its
members act in their personal capacities. Additional Protocol I, supra note 75, art. 90(1) (c).
118. Geneva Convention Relative to the TreatmentofPrlsoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
126,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
119. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 143, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
120. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 118, art. 123, and Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 119, art. 140.
121. Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, as updated at the
Twenty-fifth International Conference of the Red Cross (at which all signatories participate),
art. 5, para. 2.g, Oct. 1995 (for the ICRC role in developing international law) .
122. Mine Convention, supra note 43, 8th pmbl. para.
123. This author was present throughout the negotiations on the wording of this preambular
paragraph.
124. For example, their active observer status at the UN Human Rights Commission.
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